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ON DISARMAMENT

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18 August 1966
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

(Poland)

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA
Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV
Mr. D. POPOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. B. ASSFAW

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE
Mr. K. P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI
Mr. S. AVETTA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE
Mr. M. B. BRIMAH

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. B. KAJDY

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. I. VIRGIN

Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. I. CHEPROV

Mr. M. P. SHELEPIN

Mr. V. B. TOULINOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF

Mr. A. OSMAN

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER

Mr. L. WEILER

Mr. C. G. BREAM

Mr. A. NEIDLE

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I declare open the two hundred and eighty third plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Before making my statement as the representative of Nigeria I have an important duty to perform. As this week's chairman of the group of eight non-aligned members of this Committee, I have been delegated the duty of presenting their joint memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty (ENDC/177). Since the memorandum has already been circulated as a Conference document, it will not be necessary for me to read it. I trust that it will be given the serious attention it deserves, and I hope that the contents will guide our feet along the path desired by the community of nations -- that leading to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

I will now, if I may, proceed to make my statement as leader of the Nigerian delegation; but before making my brief remarks I wish to join others who have spoken before me in welcoming to this Committee the leader of the Brazilian delegation, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira. I wish him success in his new assignment and many years of useful service to his country and to the international community.

At this session we were expected to deal, among other things, with the following three main issues: to make substantial progress in reaching agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective control as well as on collateral measures (A/RES/2031 (XX); ENDC/161); to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty to ban effectively all nuclear weapon tests in all environments (A/RES/2032(XX); ibid.); and to conclude an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (A/RES/2028(XX); ibid.). At the close of the spring session we had not achieved much but we all went away hoping that during the recess "big man would talk to big man" -- to use a phrase made popular here by a former member of my delegation (ENDC/PV.235, p.32) -- so that we might have something tangible to report to the twenty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. At the beginning of the summer session in mid-June our hope for a break-through was further strengthened by the speeches made during the first two weeks, particularly the one made by the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont (ENDC/PV.265).

Unfortunately, however, a few days after his speech we noted a different trend -- in other words, a reversion to type. As usual, every serious proposal met with

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serious objections, and to every prepared speech there was a prepared answer. The result is that at the moment, as Mr. Trivedi has rightly pointed out, in respect of some of the issues before us we have only succeeded in defining "the issues dividing the different approaches fairly distinctly" (ENDC/PV.269, p.4) and in knowing "the few specific points which need to be settled in order to reach an agreement acceptable to all concerned" (ibid.).

We believe that everyone here is doing his little bit, within the limits of his power, to help in the solution of the problems before us; but it is an entirely different question whether we are working in the proper spirit. Someone makes a speech from a prepared text; he receives prepared replies, the forms of which we now know very well. I think we have now reached a stage at which we should put together all the proposals on the various items and examine them seriously for what they are worth. By doing so we can find out what areas of disagreement there are and what each side is prepared to take and to give.

There is also the question of creating an appropriate atmosphere in order to make progress in our negotiations. It is true that there are in the world today many events which have the effect of making our work here more difficult. In my opinion, our ultimate aim is to create a world free from fear, a world which will make the accumulation of arms unnecessary. Man will gladly do away with arms if he finds an effective alternative to war. I have no clear idea where that alternative will be found, but I think it lies in internationalism, in devising proper international organizations for settling international disputes in a free and fair manner.

It is true, of course, that if the international climate were undisturbed we should probably not be here, for there might not have been the desire to accumulate arms. The solution of the problem, which is essentially a crisis of confidence, calls for simultaneous action on two fronts. While we in this Committee try to persuade nations to do away with arms, efforts should also be made by all concerned to remove the causes of distrust and eliminate the areas of tension. Man should be assured that the international community is making honest efforts in the search for an alternative to war. In view of recent events, it is particularly necessary to reassure the weak countries. We are, however, happy to note that some men of good will all over the world are dedicated to the cause of justice for all.

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Having made those general remarks, I should like to go on to the specific issues which form the subject of my intervention. It is unfortunate that we have devoted so little time to discussing the question of general and complete disarmament. We have spent much more time on collateral measures like the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the banning of underground nuclear tests. While my delegation does not want to underrate the importance of those measures, we feel that the main task is general and complete disarmament, which constitutes the main heavenly body around which all the other satellites of disarmament measures revolve.

A clear perspective of the problems of disarmament can be seen only through the wide door of general and complete disarmament, not through the narrow windows of collateral measures. If we concentrate too much on collateral measures, we run the risk of losing sight of an important element in disarmament negotiations -- the need to maintain what some people regard as a balance of power but what I prefer to call, in more appropriate terms, a balance of military advantage throughout the whole process of disarmament negotiations.

I have chosen to use the term "balance of military advantage" because to me it conveys a fuller meaning of the idea behind the term "balance of power", for it not only takes into account the quantity and quality of arms but also recognizes the geographical factors in military strategy. It is easier to achieve that balance in the process of general and complete disarmament than if the various collateral measures are considered in isolation. It is difficult to see how anyone could talk seriously about banning the use, the production or the development of nuclear weapons while other weapons are left intact. Collateral measures, therefore, can be usefully discussed only against a background of general and complete disarmament.

The lack of a balanced approach to the problems before us has somehow affected our reasoning. For example, the representative of Czechoslovakia, speaking on 12 July, said:

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"We are convinced that it is necessary to explore new possibilities, new approaches to the solution of this problem. A new approach does not consist in side-stepping the basic problem of general and complete disarmament: the elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. The solution of this problem is the key to agreement on all other problems of general and complete disarmament. Therefore it is precisely in this regard that new paths and new possibilities for agreement must be sought." (ENDC/PV.272, p.12)

On the same day the representative of Bulgaria, speaking on the same subject, said:

"There is no doubt that in the atomic age the core of general and complete disarmament is the problem of nuclear disarmament. General and complete disarmament today means in the first place nuclear disarmament and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war." (ibid., pp. 18,19)

We agree with those statements in so far as they recognize the need for doing away with nuclear weapons. We also agree that in discussing the problems of general and complete disarmament it is necessary to explore new possibilities and new approaches; but we should hesitate, having regard to the present situation in the world, to support a programme for the destruction of all nuclear weapons as a first step to disarmament. We all hate all weapons of mass destruction. They are immoral; they are evil; they are very effective as instruments of blackmail. But we must also admit that they have served a useful purpose in their own wicked way. They have played a large part in maintaining this uneasy and bitter peace for over twenty years.

I believe that a recognition of that fact gave birth to the idea -- which has now been virtually accepted by all -- of the "nuclear shield", or "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1). General and complete disarmament must be general in concept and implementation and complete in its result. In tackling this problem, all weapons of modern warfare, together with the strategic advantages enjoyed by their respective owners, must be considered. In other words, it would be an unrealistic approach to insist on the elimination of a given type of weapon when one knows that by doing so the balance of military advantage would be tilted. That is dangerous, and I believe it is a situation we must try by all means to avoid.

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Mr. Foster, the representative of the United States, speaking on 7 July stressed that point when he said:

"In the period since the Second World War, nuclear weapons have played a central role in maintaining in the world a military balance which, so far at least, has been more stable than at some other periods in history. We regret as deeply as anyone that such particularly deadly weapons have had to play that role; but we all know they have. Until our efforts can be successful, let us hope the balance will continue to be a stable one." (ENDC/PV.271, p.27)

Put simply, our point is this: while we join all others in condemning the use and the further production of extremely dangerous weapons of mass destruction like nuclear weapons, we appreciate, to use the words of Mr. Burns, "The need to move cautiously from the position of 'peace through deterrence' to 'peace through disarmament'" (ENDC/PV.272, p.4). However, we must add that such deterrence must be the very minimum and must be done away with as soon as it has served its purpose of being a protective shield during the process of general and complete disarmament.

Before our last recess it was generally thought that by now we should have achieved something tangible in respect of the comprehensive test-ban negotiations. Unfortunately, this is another field where agreement seems to be near but yet elusive. It is unfortunate because, as the days go by, more and better nuclear weapons are being produced as a result of testing, and more radioactive materials are being disseminated -- and mankind is no better for it. It is true that some of those who engage in this undertaking do feel, rightly or wrongly, a greater sense of security; while others feel that they have reached the saturation point. However, what is of paramount importance is the interest of the international community; and to my mind that interest calls for a speedy resolution of the problem of underground tests.

One is bound to ask this question: since we have been told many times that the nuclear-weapon Powers have enough nuclear weapons to destroy every living thing on earth many times over, why are they still so interested in further research? The answer, they say, is that those weapons are being

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perfected: they are being made cleaner, more sophisticated, more effective and so forth. But any type of weapon of mass destruction is abominable regardless of its state of sophistication. Can the nuclear "haves" really preach the virtues of non-dissemination, non-possession and non-manufacture of nuclear weapons to the nuclear "have-nots"? If those who already have enough stockpiles of a particular weapon, capable of destroying every living thing on earth, continue to improve on the efficacy and sophistication of such weapons, will it not be extremely difficult to persuade others not to produce even the very elementary types? That is where the danger lies. As Mr. Foster rightly put it in his now famous article:

"Considering the lateness of the hour, the incentives that presently exist for the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the prospect that they may be acquired with increasing ease, one is forced to conclude that a really major effort involving many kinds of actions will be required if there is to be any reasonable prospect of stemming the tide." (Foreign Affairs, July 1965, Vol.43, No.4, pp.591, 592).

The main technical obstacle to the reaching of agreement on this issue has been the attitude of the two major sides to the need for verification. On the one hand there is the insistence on reliable verification, which in the absence of dependable distant instrumentation for the purpose would involve on-site inspections. On the other hand, there is the view that international controls involving on-site inspections are unnecessary. On matters of principle there are wide areas of agreement -- so much so that at times some of us begin to wonder why the technical obstacles cannot be surmounted. Mr. Fisher rightly summarized the position on 4 April when he said:

"Both parties agree that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is so important to their respective security interests that it must be adequately verified. Both parties agree that the verification system for such a treaty should not be one which demands inspection for its own sake. Both parties agree that the requirements for verification should involve no more than is necessary to give reasonable assurance that the test ban is being observed. Yet this agreement on general principles disappears when we come to the specifics of monitoring a comprehensive test ban." (ENDC/PV.254, p.16)

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At the moment there is a proliferation of useful proposals to meet the requirements of both sides. Unfortunately, however, none of those proposals has been found acceptable to both sides. At best, one side has stated the reasons for not accepting some of them and has indicated its willingness to study the others. My delegation is of the opinion that the super-Powers should give more serious consideration to those proposals, which we believe contain the seed of a final settlement of the burning issue of underground nuclear tests.

On this subject, the Western representatives have often made a point which seems to have escaped notice. They have made it clear, by implication, that they would no longer insist on on-site inspection if sufficiently reliable scientific instruments could be found for detecting and identifying all underground seismic events at a distance outside the national boundaries of a country or areas under its control where suspicious underground events have taken place. Speaking on 4 April, Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States said:

"For its part, the United States believes that some on-site inspections are essential if the parties to a comprehensive test ban are to have reasonable assurance that other parties are fully complying with it. It has supplied the scientific evidence upon which it bases this opinion. It has invited its colleagues representing the Soviet Union to present any scientific data pointing to a contrary conclusion, if they have any. This invitation, unfortunately, has not been accepted." (ibid.)

On 14 June Mr. Foster said:

"While the Soviet Government now takes the position that national systems are adequate, it has not submitted any technical data to support such a position, despite repeated requests." (ENDC/PV.264, p.10)

Speaking on 7 July, the leader of the United States delegation again made the same point, when he said:

"Many times in the past we have suggested that, if the Soviet Government has information on how to detect and identify all underground events by using distant instrumentation, it should supply that information to other governments. That suggestion has been met with a wall of silence." (ENDC/PV.271, p.29)

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We feel that it would definitely make our views on the subject clearer if an attempt were made to answer that question.

On the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons our stand has been, and still is, that the problem should not be approached as if it were solely European or regional. We have urged that the issue be treated as one affecting all mankind; and as a matter of fact the treaty, if signed, would impose heavier obligations on the non-nuclear Powers than on the nuclear Powers. Therefore we have urged, both here and in New York, that strenuous efforts must be made to realize the following additional objectives:

- "(a) a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments and for all time;
- "(b) a strengthening of United Nations capacities to maintain peace in the world and to thwart aggression against any country small or great, non-nuclear or nuclear;
- "(c) a freeze of all production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;
- "(d) the initiation of definite action aimed at the destruction of the nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the present nuclear Powers."

(ENDC/PV.235, p.32)

We are fully conscious of the fact that a non-proliferation treaty would be difficult to negotiate in the present international climate. The nature of the difficulties is reflected in the positions taken by the two major alliances on the subject and underlined by the differences in articles I and II of the United States and the Soviet Union drafts for a non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/152 and Add.1; ENDC/164). As a matter of fact, it is generally felt that the need to reconcile those articles constitutes a major obstacle to the concluding of a treaty on non-proliferation.

The issue revolves around the need to check dissemination of nuclear weapons in a military alliance. We think that it is going to be an extremely difficult task, because trying to cure this disease by a treaty is like trying to stamp out bribery by legislation. Bribery is difficult to check by legislation, because it is an operation carried out in secret, and both the giver and the receiver stand to benefit; so is dissemination of nuclear weapons

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within a military alliance. Therefore it is our opinion that, despite our efforts, it would still be possible for the dissemination of nuclear weapons to take place within a military alliance. By and large, one can rely only on the strength of character and the sense of responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers that are members of military alliances to check this evil. Therefore it is essential that the nuclear super-Powers get together and work out a scheme which would govern their behaviour in this matter.

Before I close, I should like to touch on two issues which are of considerable interest to us in Africa. The first is General Assembly resolution 2033 (XX), endorsed in operative paragraph 2 (c) of General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX), as follows:

"Nothing in the treaty should adversely affect the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories"

(ENDC/161).

Latin-American countries have already taken a positive step towards the denuclearization of their region. We in Africa are genuinely anxious to make our continent a nuclear-free zone, and in this task we ask for the co-operation of all the nuclear Powers. While my delegation supports the idea of the denuclearization of the African continent, we would insist that it be coupled with an assurance that the countries so denuclearized would not be open to nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail.

That brings me to a related and equally important matter. It is the proposal to discourage or check the arms race at regional levels, as clearly expressed in paragraph 7 of President Johnson's message to this Committee early this year, the relevant part of which reads as follows:

"We suggest therefore that countries, on a regional basis, explore ways to limit competition among themselves for costly weapons often sought for reasons of illusory prestige. The initiative for arrangements of this kind should, of course, come from the regions concerned. The interested countries should undertake not to acquire from any source, including production of their own as well as importation from others, military equipment which they proscribe. If such arrangements can be worked out and assurance can be given that they will be observed, the United States stands ready to respect them." (ENDC/165, p.3)

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Nowhere in the world is there a more urgent need to implement that proposal than on the continent of Africa, where most of the countries are engaged with all the limited resources at their command in the grim battle against poverty. They have very little or nothing to spare for the purchase of arms; but there are quite a few countries of that continent today actively engaged in the arms race and creating as a result an atmosphere of fear and anxiety. My delegation believes that this problem should be tackled simultaneously from two sides. The African countries themselves should initiate discussions on how to check the inflow of arms into the continent; and the supplying countries should exercise restraint and show a greater sense of proportion in the matter.

I should like to conclude on a general note by appealing to all concerned in our work to show a spirit of compromise and magnanimity. Here we are, representatives from seventeen countries. Compared with the number of countries in the world, seventeen is a very small number. Therefore it is a privilege that we are given this responsibility to chart, as it were, the course of complete annihilation or survival for mankind. Accordingly we cannot afford to approach the problems before us strictly from the narrow angles of national interest. As the representative of Sweden pointed out on 11 August:

"We who are seated in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have a definite responsibility to look after the interests of the world and of the future, not merely such short-term national interests of today as may stand in the way of an agreement on a higher, that is international, level of security." (ENDC/PV.281, p.8)

Therefore I call upon Mr. Fisher, the representative of the United States, to rally round the banner of peace and join in the great struggle to save man from the brink of disaster. I call upon Mr. Roshchin, the representative of the Soviet Union, to think of the millions of his fellow citizens of the world who are half-fed, half-clothed and ridden with diseases but whose lot could be improved if only a fraction of the vast sums of money now being thrown into the drains of the arms race could be saved for their benefit. I wish to remind the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, that he could have been born in Ghana or India or Mexico. I call upon all here present to remember -- adapting the words of a great English statesman -- that never in the history of mankind have so few been saddled with greater responsibility in the interest of so many.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I listened with very great interest to the thoughtful and indeed moving remarks of the representative of Nigeria. I shall study what he has said very carefully, and I hope perhaps to comment on it at a later stage in this present session. I shall also study with great interest the important memorandum (ENDC/177) which has been circulated by the eight non-aligned countries, and I hope to say something about that at one of our meetings next week.

In the United States magazine The New Yorker, with which I am sure representatives are familiar, there are often to be found short extracts from would-be persuasive business letters, and they are included in a series entitled "Letters I never finished reading". I sometimes think that we might have in this Conference a similar category of "speeches I never finished listening to". In that category I would put speeches which deal either with some vexatious subject which is quite irrelevant to our discussions here, such as the supposed iniquities of the Federal Republic of Germany, and speeches which put forward disarmament proposals which would entail no sacrifice by the proposer but are designed instead to have a severe effect on the military strength of the opposing alliance. Members of this Committee, from long and weary experience, have no difficulty by now in identifying such speeches from the first few words. It is not surprising that they evoke very little response from other members of the Committee.

It is a different matter, however, when serious and carefully thought-out suggestions for measures of arms control or arms limitation are put forward here, proposals that would involve a sacrifice for those who put them forward as well as for other countries. I should like to draw the attention of the Committee in my remarks today to what I consider to be the failure of the Soviet Union to offer any kind of constructive comment upon various proposals and ideas for collateral measures which have been put forward in this Committee. Those representatives who have had a chance to study the memorandum circulated by the eight non-aligned countries will recognize there some of the ideas to which I refer. I should also like to point out what I regard as a complete lack of response from the Soviet Union to a number of precise and important questions that have been put to its delegation at various times by other members of this Committee. Since we are approaching the end of our session, what I have to say today will be of a factual and retrospective nature.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

First, I should like to ask the Committee to join me in taking up a position as an objective observer in a dialogue that has gone on between the United States and the Soviet Union. I know, as the representative of Nigeria has pointed out, that there are seventeen nations represented here. This is not a dialogue between two super-Powers but negotiations among seventeen countries. Nevertheless we all know that nothing we decide here can be of very much lasting importance unless those decisions are acceded to and adhered to by the Soviet Union and the United States. To that extent the dialogue that goes on between them is important to us all; and I should like to trace very briefly this morning the kind of dialogue that has gone on and the comments that have been made upon it from time to time by other members of this Committee.

The proposals for a cut-off and transfer of fissile material, which offer the possibility of destroying thousands of nuclear weapons, and the plan for a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles were recalled and outlined in President Johnson's message (ENDC/165), which Mr. Foster read out at our first meeting this year (ENDC/PV.235, pp.22,25). At that same meeting the representative of Nigeria warmly welcomed the United States proposal for a transfer of fissile material from nuclear weapons to civil use. The Soviet position was set out in Mr. Kosygin's message of 3 February, which advocated "carrying out immediately the programme relating to nuclear disarmament" (ENDC/167, p.4), along with the elimination of military bases in foreign territories. The message continued:

"Only such measures, not the elimination of only a few atomic and hydrogen bombs from the vast stockpiles accumulated by States, can free the peoples from the threat of a nuclear war." (ibid.)

The representatives of Brazil and the United Arab Republic, speaking at our 244th and 245th meetings respectively, supported the need for a freeze of the production of nuclear delivery vehicles. At the 246th meeting the representative of Mexico included the freeze and the cut-off at the head of a list of measures advocated by his delegation. However, at the same meeting Mr. Tsarapkin took the same line as before and in addition suggested that the United States proposals were far from constructive and were designed simply to suit the military aims of the United States.

Mr. Fisher, it seems to me, had no difficulty at all in disposing of that accusation, for at the same meeting he pointed out:

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

"The proposition that this does not involve real reduction in armaments seems to me to be doubtful as a question of mathematics and, even more so, as a question of nuclear physics. The weapons are destroyed, the materials from them are put to peaceful uses, and the grim factories that might manufacture replacements for those materials are either stilled or converted to producing material which would not be used in weapons." (ENDC/PV.246, p.34)

He showed, I believe, that the cut-off would curb the quantitative aspect of the arms race; and he drew attention to its close connexion -- a connexion that has been emphasized by other members of this Committee -- with our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Fisher then went on to give a detailed account of how the United States proposal would work out. I shall not take the time of the Committee by quoting that in full, but I would suggest that members of the Committee might re-read pages 36 to 39 of the verbatim record to refresh their memories. I will quote what Mr. Fisher said in conclusion, because I think it is important:

"The simple and evident truth -- and I must ask the Committee to bear with me if I repeat it again -- is that we must take first steps before we take the last ones, and that we do not advance our work here if we look so hard at ultimate solutions that we neglect doing what is necessary and possible now.

"The United States is proposing a measure which is highly germane to our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

"The United States is proposing a measure which makes the largest possible use of existing international institutions for its verification.

"The United States is proposing a measure which could be put into effect now, in today's political climate.

"The United States hopes that its proposal will be studied in the light of these considerations." (ibid., p.39)

At our 247th meeting the representative of Sweden spoke of the cut-off as a measure on which the Committee should seek to reach agreement; and she again advocated its adoption in her speech at our 281st meeting. At the 248th meeting Mr. Fisher made another attempt to get a serious dialogue going on those proposals. On 17 March the representative of Canada, speaking of Mr. Tsarapkin's rejection of the proposal for the balanced reduction of certain types of bombers, said:

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

"His criticism" -- that is Mr. Tsarapkin's criticism -- "of the proposal overlooked the fact that the United States negotiators had said that they were ready to discuss the destruction of other types of nuclear weapon vehicles if the Soviet Union desired to do so. So far as the Canadian delegation knows, the Soviet Union has made no response to this practical suggestion." (ENDC/PV.249, pp.9,10).

As far as the United Kingdom knows, there has still been no response.

On 24 March the representative of Brazil referred to Mr. Fisher's speech at the 246th meeting, to which I have just referred, and he said:

"As we see it, proposals of this nature, besides being non-proliferation measures, would above all harness for the benefit of mankind energies hitherto intended for its destruction." (ENDC/PV.251, p.8)

On 14 April Mr. Foster explained the degree to which it was now possible to make unobtrusive the verification techniques that would be attendant upon a cut-off agreement. He added:

"To assert that the cut-off, transfer, and weapons destruction proposal 'has nothing in common with disarmament' amounts to stating that slowing down has nothing to do with stopping." (ENDC/PV.256, p.12)

Mr. Roshokin, replying to that in his speech on the same day, merely said:

"It is not difficult to see, however, that, taken by themselves in isolation from the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States proposals for a halt in the production of fissionable materials cannot in any substantial way have an effect on the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war, although Mr. Foster tried today to prove the contrary." (ibid.p.26)

At the next meeting the representative of Italy presented, in a particularly convincing and penetrating analysis of the question, the general case for measures to freeze weapon development. After mentioning the United States proposals, he observed:

"The West has also proposed other freezing measures which have been rejected by the Soviet delegation, but we shall not let ourselves be discouraged by that. On the contrary, we invite the Soviet delegation to tell us in what fields it would accept steps to freeze arms production. There must be such fields, even one field, in which the Soviet Union would not regard a freezing measure as harmful to its interests and security."

(ENDC/PV.257, p.22)

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

You, Mr. Chairman, speaking in your capacity as the representative of Poland, made a reply which seemed, if I may say so, to lack your usual perspicacity. In it you tried to suggest that such measures were useless because they were evidence of an approach which, you said: "assumes the cold war and its continuation to be a constant factor in international life." (ibid. p.25) You even went on to suggest that the arms race was regarded as an "indispensable element" in the policy of those advocating a cut-off of the production of fissile material and its transfer to peaceful uses and a freeze of the production of nuclear delivery vehicles. That — if I may interject an opinion in what I am trying to make a purely factual account — seems to me to reveal a serious logical weakness in the position taken by the members of the Warsaw Pact on this whole question. I might even go as far, I think as to call it a logical absurdity.

At the meeting of 21 April (ENDC/PV.258, pp. 13 et seq.) Mr. Roshchin denied the suggestion made by Mr. Burns that the Soviet Union adopted an "all or nothing" approach to disarmament; and he pointed to a number of partial measures which the Soviet delegation had supported. I should like to return to that point in a moment.

At the meeting of 2 August (ENDC/PV.278, pp.7 et seq.) the representative of the United States tried once more to clarify the Soviet Union's objections to a cut-off and a freeze and in particular its contention that the minimal inspection necessary would provide opportunities for espionage. Then at our 281st meeting he set out in some detail the simplified procedures envisaged by the United States for the verification of the cut-off, and emphasized that the Government of the United States was prepared to accept a simple cut-off of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes as a measure by itself — although the related steps it had proposed would obviously be an added benefit — if that were more acceptable to the Soviet Union. As a start it was prepared to agree to a reciprocal shut-down of reactors by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Finally, at our last meeting, the United States representative stressed the importance of including defensive systems — anti-ballistic missiles — as well as offensive systems in any freeze proposal. As he pointed out, that aspect of the arms race has only recently begun to receive the discussion it deserves; the representative of Burma drew attention to it in his speech at our 277th meeting, as did Mrs. Myrdal at the 281st, and I myself had mentioned it at an earlier meeting (ENDC/PV.265, p.5).

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

The deployment of anti-ballistic-missile defensive systems has now become a distinct possibility. The consequences of such deployment, as I have said before, would be extremely serious. It has been pointed out in speeches by other representatives at this Committee, which I have just mentioned, and it has been pointed out again and again in the writings of many serious strategic analysts. It is one more reason why we should find a way to stop the arms race now, one more reason why we should give the most careful and urgent consideration to the proposal for a freeze, before this new and dangerous ingredient is added to the mixture. Yet the representative of the Soviet Union has not so far expressed any view whatsoever on that important problem.

I must apologize to the Committee for examining our past discussions on those proposals at such length; but I think that this examination has brought out -- I hope it has brought out clearly -- the nature of the dialogue that has taken place here, the careful work that has gone into the United States formulation for these important collateral proposals. I hope it has brought home -- if it needed bringing home -- the general desire of members of this Conference to see progress made, and yet I think it has brought home, on the other hand, the total absence of response from the Soviet Union and the inadequacy of the Soviet delegation's reasons for refusing to consider these important measures seriously.

Mr. Roshchin produced reasonable evidence at our 258th meeting to show that the Soviet Union does not reject partial measures over the whole field of disarmament, and I accept that. What I cannot understand is why he then insists on an "all or nothing" approach when it comes to this particular and vitally important objective -- to curb the arms race by the direct and obvious method of curtailing the production of nuclear delivery vehicles and the manufacture of fissile material that goes into the nuclear weapons. The representative of Bulgaria, supporting the Soviet position on those proposals, said on 12 July: "But after all, you cannot empty a lake with a spoon or a bucket " (ENDC/PV.272, p.24). It seems to me an unfortunate and inadequate metaphor that compares measures of that sort with a spoon or a bucket; but, leaving aside for a moment the details of the metaphor, what I deplore about that approach is that it is quite obviously an "all or nothing" approach. If we had followed the spoon-and-bucket line of thinking on other partial measures, we should not even have reached the partial test-ban Treaty in Moscow in 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1).

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

As I said at our meeting of 5 May (ENDC/PV.262, p.11), it simply is not good enough for the representatives of the Soviet Union and its allies to dismiss these important and carefully-constructed proposals without even bothering to make any substantial comment on them. These are measures of arms limitation which would bite equally on each of the two nuclear super-Powers. Indeed, in the case of the cut-off they would bite harder on the United States. If those measures were accepted, they would go a long way to meet the overwhelming demand by all other members of this Committee and by other States not represented here to halt and start to turn back the present arms race. If the Soviet Union has serious and substantial objections to those proposals, let the Soviet representative explain them and let him go on to outline workable alternatives.

The majority of delegations here have spoken time and again, in the context of non-proliferation and during discussions devoted specifically to other collateral measures, of the need to stem the tide of weapon development. The Western Powers have set forth specific proposals for setting about that task. Members of the Committee and Members of the United Nations, which will be considering the subject of disarmament at the General Assembly quite soon, can hardly be blamed if they conclude from the Soviet Union's rigid and sometimes even apparently contemptuous attitude that it is not seriously interested in slowing down the arms race and that it is in fact prepared to let it go on unabated until that inevitably distant time when conditions are right for general and complete disarmament, on the unlikely hypothesis that an agreement covering the whole field will one day suddenly, miraculously, become possible.

I myself do not believe that that is the intention of the Soviet Union; but, if it is not its intention, it is all the more depressing to see the chance of some serious and fruitful agreement pass us by. I repeat, if the Soviet Union has valid objections to the way the United States has formulated its proposals, let us hear those objections and let the Soviet Union suggest an alternative formulation of measures which will not merely reduce tension but actually prevent the further production of nuclear delivery vehicles, inhibit the development of new weapons and any increase in the production of current ones, and even offer the possibility of destroying significant numbers of existing nuclear weapons. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union has failed to realize the overwhelming demand for such measures. I cannot believe that the Soviet Union will not conclude before long that its present position is untenable, if it has any regard for the opinion of the rest of the world.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

So much for the dialogue that has gone on concerning those important collateral measures. For the last part of my remarks this morning I should like to turn to a related aspect of our negotiations. It seems to me that one of the encouraging factors at this session is that there has been some increase in the speed of reaction by delegations to proposals put forward by other members and to important points made in their speeches. It has become much more common than it was last year, for example, for points made by one member to be taken up at the same meeting or at least at the following meeting; and I believe that that has given a more workmanlike character to our discussions. However, unfortunately there have been exceptions to that tendency. The representative of the Soviet Union has shown no sign so far of any disposition to answer a number of direct questions put to him by other representatives over the past months or to express his Government's views on certain new proposals.

For example, at our meeting on 23 June the representative of Italy asked the Soviet delegation whether the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/164) would permit nuclear consultation between allies (ENDC/PV.267, pp.14, 15). The representative of the United States repeated that question at our meeting on 28 June (ENDC/PV.268, pp.10,11). Mr. Roshchin's only reply so far has been to ask a question in return at our meeting on 30 June. His question was whether the West was thinking of consultations over the manufacture of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.269, p.32); and that really will not do, for Mr. Roshchin knows quite well that that type of consultation is quite clearly forbidden under articles I and II of the United States draft (ENDC/152 and Add.1).

Again, on another subject, at our meeting on 7 July the representative of the United Arab Republic set out an interesting proposal for a working group to study certain aspects of the theory, or concept, of deterrence (ENDC/PV.271, p.12). In my speech on 11 August I asked the members of this Committee to consider that suggestion, which I supported on behalf of my delegation (ENDC/PV.281, pp.22, 23). At our last meeting the representative of the United States commented favourably on that idea of setting up a working group (ENDC/PV.282, p.13). There has been no reaction from the representative of the Soviet Union since his very early and disappointing reply, and perhaps that was a case where a reply was given too rapidly. Perhaps it is not too much to hope that Mr. Roshchin may be prepared to give that idea fresh consideration.

Again, at our meeting on 4 August, at which the representatives of Sweden and the United States and I all spoke about ways to solve the verification difficulty in a comprehensive test ban, Mr. Fisher and I both asked the Soviet delegation for

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a clarification of its position regarding the idea of verification by invitation or challenge (ENDC/PV.279, pp.33, 15). In his reply at our meeting on 9 August (ENDC/PV.280, p.18), Mr. Roshchin gave no sign that he recognized any difference between the new proposal for verification by invitation, carefully developed and expounded by the representative of Sweden and others, and the variant of that proposal which was discussed informally at the Scarborough conference in Canada and mentioned as worthy of study by myself and by the representative of the United States.

Mr. Roshchin seemed not to distinguish between those new suggestions, designed to meet the Soviet position half-way, and the original Western proposal for a quota of inspections as of right. We still believe the latter method to be obviously the best insurance at this stage of scientific development that a treaty is certain to be observed; but despite this belief the West, because of the vital importance of securing a comprehensive test ban, is prepared to consider those new ideas. Is it too much to ask the Soviet Union to do the same?

Mr. Roshchin has said:

"The Soviet delegation has repeatedly explained that international inspections could be used to gather military information of interest to a potential aggressor. Whatever may be the method of carrying out such inspections, and whatever precautions may be taken, it cannot be denied that an obligation in regard to the carrying out of inspections would enable various kinds of 'inspection' teams to obtain access to the territory of a State without any necessity." (ibid.)

That statement bears all too visibly the signs of having been resurrected from the collection of stock responses to expressions of the long-standing Western demand for a quota of inspections as of right; but it seems to me not to be directly relevant to the new and more flexible suggestions which we have been discussing. There is, I fear, no sign so far of any willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to be flexible, to produce its proposals for an exchange of information, whether including inspections or not, which would be sufficient to make certain that all parties could be confident that a treaty was being observed. Only the Soviet Union knows the grounds for its fears of espionage; only it, if it wants to help the Committee's work in this field, is in a position to offer detailed proposals about how we can get round its own peculiar problems.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

As the representative of Sweden said, the Soviet statement that national means of verification are adequate "entails a political judgment" (ENDC/PV.279, p.7). Are we not entitled to share the scientific information on which that important political judgement is based? But, as the representative of Nigeria has pointed out in his remarks today, the Soviet representatives have ignored all our suggestions for export scientific talks and the exchange of scientific information.

In concluding, I should like to say this. In discussing non-proliferation the representative of the Soviet Union has repeatedly accused the West of intransigence, in spite of the fact that it is the West and not the Soviet Union which has shown a practical willingness to meet objections to the first United States draft treaty (ENDC/152) by tabling amendments to it (ENDC/152/Add.1). I hope that I have shown today that the Soviet Union is itself vulnerable to the charge of rigidity and intransigence over a wide field of discussion on collateral measures. As Mr. Fisher said at our last meeting, on 16 August: "Before a compromise can be worked out there must be motion from both sides." (ENDC/PV.282, p.28) I hope Mr. Roshchin will take to heart his own appeal to the West in his speech at the same meeting (ibid.) and show himself genuinely prepared to do all that is in the power of the Soviet Union to help our work forward.

I should like to stress that that is my objective and, I believe, the objective of the entire Committee. My aim in speaking today has not been a polemical aim; it has been directed towards the objective of securing a compromise. I hope that I may have gone some little way towards convincing the Soviet Union that its rigidity is against its own interests and those of its allies and that to continue that rigidity will serve only to reduce its influence in these negotiations and to stand in the way of our progress.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should not like to let pass this meeting, during which the eight non-aligned delegations have submitted a very interesting document on the banning of tests (ENDC/177), without expressing the satisfaction of the Italian delegation at this new and important contribution to our work by the non-aligned delegations.

We all remember the value and usefulness of the documents submitted by the non-aligned delegations of Geneva to the General Assembly of the United Nations last year in facilitating the debates and leading the work of the Assembly to favourable, positive and unanimous conclusions. I am sure that the document submitted unanimously today by the non-aligned delegations will be a very useful basis for our future work, whether at the United Nations or here. In my opinion this document is a proof of the wealth of ideas and proposals of the non-aligned delegations. It is also a proof of the active and intelligent way in which they wish to explore all avenues that could lead to an agreement on a test ban.

Furthermore, I should like in particular to stress the generous character of this document. The text of the memorandum recalls:

"... that a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests would in itself constitute an effective measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such a treaty, supplementing the prohibitions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, would make practically impossible for a very long time the development of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear-weapon countries, as well as inhibit the further sophistication of nuclear weapons". (ibid., p.2).

All that is certainly true. But what must be stressed in this context is that the non-aligned delegations solemnly reaffirm their determination to accept, without any special prior condition or any particular counterpart, such a treaty as would limit, in fact eliminate, the possibility of those countries becoming nuclear Powers.

Within the framework of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which would deprive their countries of the possibility of becoming nuclear States, the non-aligned delegations do not even raise the problem of guarantees, which on the contrary arises in a very awkward way in connexion with a non-proliferation treaty. This generous and courageous willingness of the non-aligned delegations to accept a test-ban treaty

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

without any special counterpart and without any particular commitment by the nuclear countries is in my opinion an additional reason why the nuclear countries should make every possible effort to conclude as soon as possible a treaty which, in certain respects, presents fewer difficulties than a non-proliferation treaty. I think that the delegations of the non-aligned countries, in submitting their memorandum today, have given new and powerful encouragement to the concluding of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and have made a very valuable contribution to our work.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): I should like to say a few words in my capacity as representative of Poland in reply to the very interesting statement made today by the representative of the United Kingdom. Lord Chalfont concluded his statement by saying: "My aim in speaking today has not been a polemical aim; it has been directed towards the objective of securing a compromise." I know that Lord Chalfont is a master of understatement, but I would say that that is indeed the understatement of the year. In my opinion his statement has presented the views of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in an inaccurate and distorted manner.

I do not intend to substitute myself for the representative of the Soviet Union, for I am sure he will give proper replies to the questions raised by Lord Chalfont. I should only like to ask the Committee's indulgence for a minute or two because I was personally mentioned in Lord Chalfont's statement as lacking my usual perspicacity in replying to the proposals put forward by our Western colleagues. He even quoted from the verbatim record of my statement at the meeting of 19 April. Since it was a quotation from my statement, I think it advisable to put the record straight and to place the sentence quoted by Lord Chalfont in its proper context.

First, I should like to say that my speech was not a reply to the proposals put forward by the delegation of the United States; it was a very brief statement on the general problem of collateral measures and our approach to the solution of the problem by the application of collateral measures. I started by saying:

"...we have a right to ask the following question: what is the point of examining the various collateral measures submitted to our consideration if we cannot surmount the difficulties or smooth over the differences standing in the way of the conclusion of a non-proliferation agreement?" (ENDC/PV.257, p.24).

(The Chairman, Poland)

It seems to me that lack of progress in the field of non-proliferation hampers progress in all other directions. I would subordinate the consideration of all other collateral measures which have been submitted to us to the simple fact that up to now we have not been able to overcome the difficulties standing in the way of the concluding of a non-proliferation agreement. I still believe it is very difficult to assume that a nuclear Power is really willing to start on the way towards nuclear disarmament when at the same time it manifests its desire to distribute nuclear weapons in one form or another and to share its nuclear weapons with other countries.

In the opinion of the Polish delegation, that is the crux of the matter; and I am afraid that as long as there is no clear indication on the part of the United States and the United Kingdom that they are willing to enter into an agreement with us to ban all possibilities -- direct or indirect -- of disseminating nuclear weapons there will be little possibility of reaching agreement in other spheres.

Mr. TRIVEDI (India): I should like to remove one misunderstanding, and that is in regard to a certain confusion which might exist between a non-proliferation treaty and a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I am speaking not on behalf of the eight non-aligned delegations but only on behalf of the Indian delegation. At the same time, as I am taking the floor after the representative of Italy, I think it would be appropriate if I thanked him for his kind words concerning the joint memorandum (ENDC/177) submitted by those delegations.

The reference to asking for something in return, about which the Italian representative spoke, is not, I think, quite an appropriate description of the principle included in resolution 2028 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly, which mentions "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers" (ENDC/161). It is not a question of somebody asking for something; it is not a question of a trade-off, as it were. It is a question of a balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities.

The nuclear test-ban treaty is a perfectly balanced measure. I am not speaking in terms of the joint memorandum; for, as I have said, I am not speaking on behalf of the eight non-aligned delegations. However, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would impose the same restrictions on all countries. It would not state that certain countries must not do some things, while others might continue to do them.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I should like to clarify something which you, Mr. Chairman, said when you were speaking in your capacity as representative of Poland. I shall, of course, study the verbatim record with very great care; but you seem to be suggesting -- unless I misunderstood you -- that the vexatious problem which we sometimes call "nuclear sharing", which I recognize as being a serious problem in our discussions, is now standing in the way not only of agreement on non-proliferation but of agreement on other collateral measures as well. I hope I was not right in thinking you said that; because if so I regard it as a very depressing new turn in the direction of this Committee.

While I am speaking, I should also simply like to point out to you, Sir, and to the Committee that what you said at the meeting of 19 April is in the verbatim record (ENDC/PV.257). I have it in front of me, and it is there for everyone in the Committee to read.

Finally, perhaps on a slightly more agreeable note, I would echo your hope that the answers to my questions will indeed be given by the representative of the Soviet Union.

Mr. ROSHCHEIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should merely like to make a few preliminary comments in connexion with the statement made by Lord Chalfont.

As you, Mr. Chairman, quite rightly pointed out, Lord Chalfont's statement was purely polemical. I must say that, to our very great regret, when we read the statements of the representative of the United Kingdom we do not find in them any constructive elements. This, of course, cannot fail to sadden us to some extent, since such statements do not provide any basis that would enable us to engage in a concrete examination of the various problems of disarmament. A purely polemical statement will remain a polemical statement also in our consciousness today; and tomorrow, of course, it will be forgotten and disappear from our memory.

We have to note that in Lord Chalfont's statement some particular questions were wrested from the context of major problems and that on them were constructed what I would call attempts to cast doubts on the position of the Soviet delegation to the effect that it does not reply to certain questions, that it does not raise certain questions, and that it does not manifest a proper interest in the particular problems which the Western side puts forward.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The principal characteristic of Lord Chalfont's statement today was that he evaded the main question which we have put forward here and which we have discussed for a good many weeks and months: namely, that the Western side has virtually not submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee for consideration any treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The document which was submitted and the amendments which have been repeatedly mentioned by the United Kingdom and some other Western delegations were in the nature of amendments to a treaty for regulating the use of nuclear weapons by a non-nuclear Power. That is the gist and heart of the matter.

Therefore when the reproach is levelled at us that, for instance, we have refused to set up a working group, we put the question once again to the United Kingdom delegation and to those delegations which put forward this proposal: "On what is such a group to work?" As we have already pointed out, is it to work on how to organize the traffic in narcotics, or on banning the traffic in narcotics? Here this analogy is altogether appropriate. What should we set up a working group for; what is there to discuss? Are we to discuss what measures of restriction we should take in respect of non-nuclear countries which acquire nuclear weapons from nuclear countries? Are we to discuss the question of electronic locks, the right of "veto", or withdrawal from the treaty? From what treaty? From a treaty to regulate the use of nuclear weapons, or from a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons?

I must say that we are certainly surprised that the United Kingdom should completely ignore so important and, I would say, so cardinal a question as that which we are discussing here and on which the work of the Committee depends, by raising certain questions to which we have not replied. We have not replied to them simply because time limits our possibilities. And of course we cannot waste the time of the Committee by replying to questions which as a matter of fact have already been settled by life itself and are irrelevant, and to which in the final analyses we have given replies. They were perhaps brief ones because these questions did not merit lengthy replies.

We have been told that we have not thrown light on some particular aspects, and that we have not replied to the particular questions which have been put to us in connexion with a treaty on non-proliferation. We have asked: which provisions in the non-proliferation treaty which we have submitted to you are not to your liking? We are prepared to discuss possible amendments, we are prepared to discuss additions,

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we are prepared to discuss various other aspects that are really connected with the problem of non-proliferation. But we have to note with regret that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States delegation has so far given a single hint that they wish to propose amendments, changes, or additions to a real non-proliferation treaty, and not to a treaty which provides for the regulation of the use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear Powers, which will obtain such weapons from nuclear States, will possess these weapons, and will in fact be able to use them if they manage to force these "locks", these "electronic locks", about which we have been told so much here, although this is absolutely irrelevant to the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

There has now been levelled at us the reproach that we have not examined certain proposals which the Western Powers have been insistently putting forward for consideration in the Committee: namely the question of a "cut-off" and other matters. In regard to these questions we have already given fully exhaustive replies. Of course our replies neither suit nor satisfy the United Kingdom and United States delegations. That is quite understandable. Indeed, it could hardly be expected that they would be satisfied with this and withdraw their proposals.

But, in choosing the collateral measures which we are to discuss here, we must have some criterion. We have not enough time to discuss all the questions which the delegation of the United Kingdom or the United States puts forward for consideration by the Committee. The Soviet delegation has chosen a criterion: the resolutions of the General Assembly. The General Assembly has given us a number of tasks (ENDC/161). It has requested us to consider the question of non-proliferation (A/RES/2028 (XX)). We are examining this subject to the fullest extent. We have been instructed to consider the question of banning underground nuclear weapon tests (A/RES/2032 (XX)). We are examining it.

In this connexion we have stated our views concerning a number of proposals which have been submitted by the non-aligned States and which give us complete satisfaction. We have particularly stressed and we stress today, in connexion with the memorandum submitted by the representatives of the non-aligned States (ENDC/177), that the suggestion put forward by the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.259) is very interesting, and not only interesting but also very logical and very realistic. And we have said that it could serve as a basis for considering the question of underground tests and that we are willing to regard it as a basis for the solution of this problem.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

In regard to a number of other questions we have made constructive comments. We have heard no such constructive comments from the United Kingdom delegation. We have examined the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Why? Not because we wished to do so, not because we wished to impose our will on the Committee, not because we wished to divert the attention of the Committee from the most urgent problems, but because there was a definite decision of the General Assembly on this subject (ENDC/161, p.2). That is quite logical. And we have strictly followed the logic that has been suggested and recommended to us by the resolutions of the General Assembly. It is odd to hear how the United Kingdom delegation, despite the unanimous resolution of the General Assembly on the question of denuclearized zones (A/RES/2033(XX); ENDC/162), completely by-passes this question, just as it does the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

There is a resolution of the General Assembly, an appeal to the colonial Powers to consider the question of dismantling military bases in colonial territories and of not establishing new ones in such territories (A/RES/2105(XX)). That is the working logic which the Soviet delegation has followed in examining and devoting attention to collateral measures in the field of disarmament, in strict accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly.

That, in our opinion, is the only correct way when there is a difference of views as to which questions we should examine here. If we take, for example, the list of collateral measures which we proposed in 1964, we shall see that it included eight collateral measures -- eight proposals for collateral measures. In this case we have refrained from expounding, defending and enlarging on all these eight collateral measures only because the time we have at our disposal must be apportioned in such a way as to enable greater attention to be given to those questions on which more than a hundred States expressed their views at the session of the General Assembly. That should be the criterion. We have applied that criterion. We have applied it constructively. In regard to each of these proposals we have put forward definite and concrete considerations.

Apart from the polemical character of Lord Chalfont's statement, I must say that it was not a constructive statement. In this connexion we can only express our profound disappointment at the fact that one of the prominent delegations here in the

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Committee did not deem it possible, in regard to a single one of the questions which we are considering here, to put forward any detailed and constructive proposals or to speak from constructive positions of principle, but merely confined itself to a purely polemical statement.

Lord CHALFONT (United Kingdom): I am sorry to take up the time of the Committee again, but I must make one comment on the remarks of the representative of the Soviet Union. I am sorry that he found my remarks extremely controversial and polemical, but it can scarcely be said that he did not reply in kind.

I should, however, like to make one point about his splendidly impressive display of outrage, and it is that it was in one respect based, I think, on a misunderstanding. Mr. Roshchin seemed to be under the impression that I had proposed or endorsed a proposal for a working group on the subject of non-proliferation. That, of course, is not so, as he will see when he studies the verbatim record. I endorsed a proposal by the representative of the United Arab Republic for a working group to study the concept of deterrence (ENDC/FV.271, p.12), not to study the workings of non-proliferation.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I am unfortunately obliged to note that the Soviet position has changed and has become still more intransigent. When the United States delegation submitted its draft treaty on non-proliferation (ENDC/152) last year, no delegation -- certainly not the Soviet delegation -- protested, and no one said that this draft did not concern non-proliferation. Now, after lengthy discussions, the Soviet delegation points out that the draft treaty submitted by the United States delegation and supported by the other Western delegations is not a non-proliferation treaty but a treaty concerning other matters. This is a disturbing change of attitude which unfortunately betokens a hardening of the Soviet position.

Furthermore, where the working group is concerned I did not quite understand Mr. Roshchin's statement. I think he was referring to the group which I myself had suggested for a comparative examination of the two draft treaties on non-proliferation (ENDC/PV.272, pp.26 et seq.). For my part I remain convinced that in certain respects the two texts contain points of similarity, points of rapprochement, and that -- apart, of course, from the question of control -- there is on other questions a possibility

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of our reaching agreement and drafting a common text. That is why I have insisted, and continue to insist, on the usefulness of undertaking a comparison of the two draft treaties and doing so in a working group.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland): We have two more meetings -- next Tuesday and Thursday -- before the close of this session. There may be a long list of speakers or the list may be short; we do not know. There is the possibility of an additional meeting if the number of speakers is too many to be heard in the two meetings scheduled for next week. Therefore I would suggest that the delegations that would like to address the Committee next week should inform the Secretariat as early as possible so as to enable it to plan the work for next week.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 283rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Mieczyslaw Blusztajn, representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Nigeria, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland, India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"The delegations of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic tabled a joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 23 August 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

^{1/} Circulated as document ENDC/177